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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
COY RINGO, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs.JOHN W. TURNER, Warden
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No. 10255

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant Coy Ringo appeals from the denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus by the District Court of
the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant Coy Ringo and others filed a petition in
the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, challenging their detention in the California State Prison at
Folsom, California, pursuant to an interstate compact
agreement between the State of Utah and the State of
California. The respondent, subsequent to the filing of
appellant's petition, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. On August 28, 1964, the matter was
heard before the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, sitting in
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the Third Judicial District. On October 9, 1964, Judge
Swan made a minute entry denying the appellant's petition
for habeas corpus and granting the state's motion to dismiss
the petition. Subsequently, on the 4th day of November
1964, a notice of appeal was filed. No order was ever entered by the court reflecting the court's judgment as recited
in the minute entry.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the appeal should be dismissed.
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS
The appellant Coy Ringo was committed to the Utah
State Prison for the crime of robbery on November 15,
1955. Subsequently, on l\1ay 23, 1962, the appellant \ras
transferred, pursuant to action by Governor George D.
Clyde and in accordance with the Western Interstate Corrections Compact adopted in 1959, to the State of California for imprisonment where he is now being held in Folsom Penitentiary. Between the time of appellant's original
commitment to the Utah State Prison and his transfer
to the California authorities, he was adjudged guilty of
another crime, being assault on a convict with malice aforethought, in violation of 76--7-12, Utah Code Annotated
1953; State v. Ringo, 14 U.2d 49, 377 P.2d 646.
ARGU1\1ENT
POINT I
THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DIS~IISSED SINCE NO FINAL
ORDER HAS EVER BEEN ENTERED IN THE INSTANT
CASE.

In Aldridge v. Beckstead, 396 P.2d 830 ( Ctah 1964)'
this court observed that where the appellant had failed to
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have a final judgment entered in a habeas corpus proceeding, the appeal was premature and should be dismissed. In
the instant case the record reflects no final judgment by the
trial court. The only evidence of the trial court's decision
was a minute entry to the effect that the state's motion to
dismiss the appellant's petition was granted. It is well established that a minute entry, showing the entry of order, is not
a final judgment which will sustain an appeal. Robison v.
Fillmore Commercial & Savings Bank, 61Utah398, 213 P.
790; Lukich v. Utah Construction Co., 46 Utah 317, 150 P.
298. Consequently, it is submitted that the instant appeal
should be dismissed.
POINT II
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE APPELLANT'S PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS SHOWS ON ITS FACE THAT THERE
IS NO BASIS FOR RELIEF.

The appellant's sole contention is that his confinement at
Folsom Prison in California, pursuant to the Western Interstate Corrections Compact, is contrary to the Constitution
of the United States, Article I, Section 10, and contrary to
the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 18, in that it has
an ex post facto application to the appellant.
Section 77-63-1, U.C.A. 1953, adopted the Western
Interstate Corrections Compact into law on behalf of the
State of Utah in 1959. It allows the State of Utah to enter
into a contract with the various thirteen western states,
including California, in order to

"* * * improve their institutional facilities and provide

programs of sufficiently high quality for the confinement treatment and rehabilitation of various types of
'
offenders,
* * *. ''
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Pursuant to the Western Interstate Corrections Compact, a
contract was entered into between the State of Utah and
the State of California and as a result thereof the appellant
was transferred, from the State of Utah to the State of
California in accordance with the act, to undergo his confinement at Folsom Penitentiary in California. 77-63-2,
U.C.A. 1953, empowers the Board of Corrections to transfer any inmate to any institution within or without the
State of Utah, pursuant to Article III of the Compact, after
a contract has been entered into. The governor, pursuant to
77-63-5, U.C.A. 1953, is expressly authorized to enter into
contracts with states which are parties to the Western Interstate Corrections Compact. The compact does not provide
for an increase in the minimum or maximum sentence
which an inmate may serve. In no way does the compact
increase the penal sanctions imposed against the individual
inmate. The sole purpose of the compact and the result that
it achieves is to allow the states to use institutions of other
states which may be more suitable for confinement of a particular prisoner.
It is well established that the provisions of Article I,
Section 10, of the United States Constitution, and Article I,
Section 18, of the Utah Constitution apply only to penal
laws which have the effect of applying retroactively to make
criminal an act done which was not criminal when performed, or to aggravate a crime or intensive the punishment, or alter the legal rules of evidence, making for an
easier conviction. 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 351 notes:
"The expression 'ex post facto laws' is a technical
one which was in use long before the Revolution and
had acquired an appropriate meaning by legislators,
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lawyers, and authors. The phrase is one which relates
exclusively to criminal or penal statutes."
In this regard, in In re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492, it
was rnled that a Kansas statute providing for the restraint
and care of the criminally insane, enacted subsequent to the
commission of the crime, was not ex post facto since it was
not a criminal act but was one prescribing for the care and
treatment of insane persons. In Rubin, et al., The Law of
Criminal Correction, page 279, speaking with reference to
interjurisdictional cooperation, it is stated:
"* * * 'a prisoner has no constitutional right to be incarcerated in a particular geographic location. Prisoners confined inf ederal penitentiaries, for example, may
be confined in any part of the United States without
violation the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment.'"

Congress has apparently felt that there is no constitutional
objection to allowing state prisoners to be confined in federal penitentiaries since they have expressly authorized the
Attorney General to receive state prisoners for confinement
in federal correctional institutions. 18 U.S.C. 5003. The
sole purpose of such interjurisdictional compacts is to provide a modern device for rehabilitation. See Hinkle, Interstate Cooperative Institutionalization - a Modern Device
for Rehabilitation, 8 Journal of Public Law 509 ( 1959).
As is noted in Rubin, et al., The Law of Criminal Correction, page 284, the principal purpose behind acts similar to
the Western Interstate Corrections Compact is to allow the
transfer of prisoners to meet the best needs of the prisoner
and the confinement system:
"The leaislature has full authority to determine
b
where prisoners
may be sent. It usually delegates t he
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responsibility to the courts, but it may also assign it to
an administrative agency, and this is not an invasion of
judicial power. The power is important for a correction department whose institutions have been diversified. Thus it has been observed that 'the difference
between the various institutions in our penal system is
no longer a difference in the degree of discomfort each
will impose upon prisoners, but rather a difference in
the security or treatment that is needed for particular
individuals, since all our penal institutions today seek
to rehabilitate the prisoner. In order to use the various
institutions to the best practical advantage, it is necessary that certain prisoners be transferred from time
to time for the benefit of those around them and themselves.' Transfers are commonly made for reasons of
discipline or security, reclassification, or hospital treatment."
It is obvious from what has been noted above that this does
not constitute ex post facto legislation.
In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 386, the United
States Supreme Court enumerated the factors that may
make a law ex post facto:

"* * *

1st. Every law that makes an action done before
the passing of the law, and which was innocent when
done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th.
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence,
in order to convict the offender."

An analysis of the corrections compact against the enumerated forms of ex post facto legislation makes it mani-

7
fest that the Western Interstate Corrections Compact is not
ex post facto legislation merely because a prisoner, subsequent to its enactment, has his place of confinement
changed.
In Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U.S.) 138, the Supreme
Court of the United States stated:

"***A ex post facto law is one which renders an act
punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable
when committed."
In the instant case, the appellant's conviction has always
been punishable by confinement in a prison for a period of
the rest of his natural life. The mere fact that the place of
his confinement is changed does not enhance the punishment or change the nature of the sentence. See also Corwin,
Constitution of the United States of America, (1952), page
327. In Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 ( 1915),
South Carolina changed the punishment for a capital crime
from hanging to electrocution and provided that it would
take place in the state penitentiary and further made various changes in the manner in which the execution would be
carried out. The United States Supreme Court ruled that
this was not ex post facto legislation. This court in the case
of Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 103
Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523 (1943), noted that the Utah and
federal constitutions prohibiting ex post facto legislation
are limited to criminal and penal matters.
In the instant case it is apparent that the purpose of the
kgislation was to assist in carrying out the correctional purposes of prison confinement to rehabilitate and to maintain
adequate discipline. There is no basis for a conclusion that
the instant legislation is ex post facto merely because it was
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enacted after the appellant's first conviction which he is still
serving.
POINT III
HABEAS CORPUS IS AN INAPPROPRIATE REMEDY TO
CHANGE THE PLACE OF CONFINEMENT.

It is well established that habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy to challenge the place of a prisoner's confinement. Consequently, the court was well within its prerogatives in dismissing the petition as an attempt to use an inappropriate remedy for the result the appellant sought to
achieve. In Ex parte TruittJ 54 F.Supp. 999 (D.C. E.D.
Ill. 1944), the court observed that habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to challenge the place of confinement
even if the petitioner's commitment directed he serve in an
institution different from that where he was being held.
In U.S. ex rel Gapinski v. RagenJ 152 F.2d 268 (7th Cir.
1945), a state prisoner challenged his transfer from the Illinois State Penitentiary to an institution for the criminally
insane. In rejecting his petition for habeas corpus, the court
states:
"Petitioner's complaint is directed to his transfer
from Joliet to Menard. This is an administrative function and one which is authorized by the Illinois Statutes. See Ill.Stat.Ann. Chap. 108, Secs. 110-112. In
fact, the officials are required to make periodic examinations in order to determine whether or not any
inmate of a penal institution should be transferred to
the Psychiatric Division. The record demonstrates
that the administrative officials followed the statute
relative to petitioner's transfer. His complaint is without foundation for purposes of this petition."
See also Swanson v. ]onesJ 151 Neb. 767, 39 N.W.2d 557
( 1949); ViRileos v. State, 84 Ariz. 404, 330 P.2d 116
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( 1958) . In the latter case, the Arizona Supreme Court
acknowledged that the petitioner's confinement was at an
institution contrary to specific directives of the Arizona
Constitution but ruled that habeas corpus was an inappropriate remedy to effect the transfer.
This court has heretofore recognized limitations on the
power of habeas corpus. Jones v. Moore, 61Utah383, 213
P. 191; Chapman v. Graham, 2 U.2d 156, 270 P.2d 821.
Certainly the petitioner has no basis for habeas corpus
attacking the place of his confinement whereas here the
transfer is obviously for the purpose of discipline or because
the conditions of petitioner warrant the transfer and where
the transfer is authorized by law. 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus,
Sec. 29-1.
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court acted properly in dismissing the appellant's petition.
CONCLUSION
The appellant's contention that his confinement, pursuant to the Western Interstate Corrections Compact, is in
violation of the Federal or Utah Constitutions is patently
without merit. If any event, the petitioner may not attack
the place of his confinement by writ of habeas corpus.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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law, or law impairing the obligation of cGDtracts, or t:o
, r~nt any title of nobility."
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~TB ~OU OQlt-

PACT IS EX POST PAClO t11B11 AR-PLUD l'O
PBRSOlfS WBO WBR.B aGIVXcm.D Am> S8l'DClW

PRIOR '1"0 DW •ABSAGB.

ln Wharton'• Cri•inal Law Section
20 at paqe 43 it 1a atatad aa follotin11

"By virtue of tb• ~owiaiona
of the United states Constitution,
neither the aanqreaa nor the
state leqialaturea may adopt
ax post: faet.o legialaUOA, that
is, a statute is unconstitu~ional
whiah at:t...,U to app~y mtlfOactively a penalty or punishment
to an act wlaiah waa innoG9tt w,b.en
done, or which increases the
penalty 'Which wu acu<Jhed 1:o Che
act at the time of ita comnd•efon,

or in aay way al•en i:h• poai.tion
of the defendant to his dia-

advaata'l'I. •

Ona

of

the major ia•u•• preae11ted

by the appellant in hi• petition for a
writ of habaaa corpia and in his appeal

ia .:.:hether the waatarn IntentatG

7

Corre~-

.:~. ~ ~

.,

:!. '. ~ ::-... . . ~.:...!..·~; '·~.
: r:-·
_.·.
...

t.,.•. .:_

~

..

·'·'

'·

~

.

,

\.

·i..:•

1 '.

, !J

' ,,.,_~

~·•·-<"

-- J. l

-•

'")':-.iJ

...

;>

:

,~

i" .•

·:

r: .•

J .I'

' .

-~

•

.

;

J

1.
\'
L

• t ..

f '.

: r.

-~

!'

·.:

tions CC>mpact is ex poat facto aa to a
1:-·eraon who waa tried, convicted and aeaten-

ced prior to the pasaa9e thereof.
the Utah State

Coa•titutioa

aad

Both

tbe

Gonatitution of the United Stat.. pro~ibit

ex poet facto 199i1lation.
In the

case of Bx Pane ri.ra fouN\

dt 31 &. B. 2d 482, the ~upz-. C::~ Of -

the state of Cl1io wae c:onfJrOAted wA.tla •
similar situation.

Ill the Qiio <:ase, aa

individual kad been

a~d

to aerve

a term in the Obio st.ate Jleforwatocy.
3ubeequently, an aC't
·lhich perm.i tted

1

~

.-ffaoU.,.

the tra.n.sfc of the

µriaoner to the Ohio State »-.itetJ.&ry.
The prisoner waa t!her•ft.er confined in
~ ~rison

farua at the atate p4nitentiary.

'l'he Ohio supreme Court held that particaVlr act ex poat facto as to Mr. Fl.oft
tnd grutted relief.
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Where Utah prisoners are taken from
the utah State Penitentiary and incarr:::~eratcd

in various places of confinement

throughout the several states which are

rneribers of the Com.pact, the Utah prisoners .Jre deprived of their. rights to
.·onfer with their local apirit:ual advisor, their local counsel, and are

~rohibi

ted from visiting with their friends and
relatives.

This ia obviously an altera-

tion of their punishment to their
detriment and disadvantage.

'!be

ap~lica

tion of the Western Interatate Correction.a
Com1act is there.fore ex po•t facto as to

E,eraons who w$re tried, convicted a.nd aentenced prior to ita paaaage.

ram

FOUR

iT .IT!IER THE LEGISLATIVE NOR THE EXECU'l'IVB
mt\N:~IES OF GOVERNMENT CAN REVERSE

cm

LTBR THE JUDGMENT OF COUR'l'S EXCEFT Dl

9

INLJTi\lllCES PR.OVXD&D i'Oit PRIOR TO 'l'BB TDCB

THE JUDGMBlft WAS IUDIDERBJ).

It ia to be remembered that for the

pur1XJse of this appeal the facts set
forth in the petition for writ of habea•
corpue muat be

ua-4 to

JDe

true.

In

the petition it i• &1llllf9d that ta.
District

Co\l~

of a.al• J.ake Coriaty

ordered the }*titi•ar Ille eOD.fi.ned and
impriaoned ip .she

Bah..•tAM

l••am

(emphallia an:re).
J:n

an •rly

~

dlloided b;r the

supr_. CO.rt. of tile ,_.ritoa:y ., Utah
known aa .tn 8e
5

u.

."1.141• Ql.nMa,-

to.ad

358, tile lu.PC•···~fO&'

•be

at

Territory of Utab . . ~ with a
situation ill whJ.cb a prisoner had be-1
convicted and B9111laaced

Clift

blD ablu'gea,

one iolygamy and tM ot:ller c:a-hllW.tation.
SUbaequently a law ,... pa.encl ~q

10

; .y,.: ::he c.-:hortening of sentences for good
condu ~:t.

The Court in holding that the

subse ucnt statute could not affect the
·.· rior nentence and conviction, stated:
"L~ \:e

should allow the act

of the legislature passed si.nc:e

the sentence to control, it in
erfect is to aciy that the le«JJAL:tnre can, after judgment,

nullify the ju.dgment and aet
the 1risoner free.
le~islature

~;entence

If the

ca.n reduce the

at all, subsequent

to the sentence, it can redw:•
.Ct to ::.:n unlimited extent. Thia
\iou ld be encroaching upo.n the

.:iuthority of the executive,
els it is the p.l'OVinoe of the
m·~ecu ti ve, and not the le9isla ture, to reprieve or pardon.
It would also Qt all<"··~ig,g ,tht

legislature

59·~9'f'C'Xi~

the iudicial bpnoh of tht

qoyerDmfJD1=· and to W'HP

U...

duties. and to Mkt I MMIPCI
apg iudgment different f;pm
that entchJfd in cou,J'\1

(emphasis ours)

•

The District Court ordered the
, er t:.:ioner
. :.

i;

to be imprisoned in the Utah

c i. rison.

His :t-iresent confinement in

11

·•'

•.

: ~-· .

·.'

~

1:'1c

(~alifornia

state Prison at Folaom,

ca lif ~>rnia, is in violation of that

order, and is therefore without author-

CONCLYSIQN
rl,intiff's petition for a writ of
~F• be,rn

corpus

states a cause of action

uton .. hich relief can be granted, and

the ;iction of the District Court in dia;iL::sin·-; said petition should be reversed.

1

Respectfully aubnitted,
MARK & SCHOBIDIALS

,-~w
903 Kearns Building
salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorneys for
:Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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Re.::ei ved t.wo copies of the foregoing
Brit~f

this 15th day of January, 1965.
Attorney General of the
state of Utah

BY.---------------------
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